Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy of Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. by Swisher, Peter N.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2002
Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy of Bird v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
Peter N. Swisher
University of Richmond, pswisher@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy of Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 Nev L. J. 351 (2002) .
INSURANCE CAUSATION ISSUES:
THE LEGACY OF BIRD V.
ST. PAUL FRE & MARINE INS. Co.
Peter Nash Swisher*
In jure non remota causa, sed promixa, spectatur. [In law not the remote cause, but
the proximate, is looked to.]
Lord Chancellor Bacon's First Maxim of Law1
I. INTRODUCTION
In all of Anglo-American law, there is no concept that has been as been so
pervasive - and yet so elusive - as the causation requirement; and even today
this causation requirement in American law has resisted all efforts to reduce it
to a useful, understandable, and comprehensive formula regarding its underly-
ing nature, content, scope, and significance.2 Indeed, no less an authority than
William Lloyd Prosser has stated that there "is perhaps nothing in the entire
field of the law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the
opinions are in such a welter of confusion" than legal causation issues, "despite
the manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject."' 3 Accord-
ingly, various commentators over the years have analyzed, criticized, and dis-
cussed legal causation issues from a traditional negligence perspective, 4 from
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School; B.A. Amherst College, 1966;
M.A. Stanford University, 1967; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of Law,
1973.
l Reprinted in 7 SPEDDING, ELLIS & HEATH, THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 327 (1870).
2 See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1737 (1985).
3 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984). I still remember the day Professor
Prosser introduced me and my first year Torts class to proximate cause in 1971 with these
introductory remarks: "Now we will analyze proximate cause. I have studied proximate
cause issues for well over sixty years now, but I'm still not sure that I fully understand the
concept. It will, however, be on your final examination."
4 See, e.g., Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633
(1920); James A. McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1929); Charles E.
Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. REV. 229 (1932);
William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REV. 19 (1936);
Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 71 (1950); Wil-
liam L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369 (1950); Fleming James
Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951); Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67
YALE L.J. 1 (1957); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L.
REV. 543 (1962); Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985);
Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991).
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a law and economics approach,5 and even from the framework of chaos
theory.6
Most research and analysis into causation has occurred in the context of
tort law,7 and since insurance law is something of a hybrid between tort and
contract,8 a number of courts traditionally applied "classic tort" causation prin-
ciples to insurance contract disputes as well.9 However, in recent years, causa-
tion in insurance law has evolved dramatically from a traditional "classic tort"
causation framework to take on a separate interpretive life of its own. Indeed,
if the concept of proximate cause "so nearly does the work of Aladdin's
lamp"'1 then Justice Benjamin Cardozo arguably was the Genie in Aladdin's
lamp, in creating magnificent and wondrous principles of legal causation in tort
law" and insurance law 1 2 as these two interpretive roads diverged in the chal-
lenging and foreboding bramble bush forest of insurance coverage disputes.
This Article will analyze the highly significant evolution of legal causation
from its hybrid tort and insurance law origins, and discuss the dramatic effect
that Benjamin Cardozo's seminal landmark causation decisions still have on
present-day insurance law.
II. LEGAL CAUSATION: THE TORT LAW FOUNDATION
Despite the fact that some commentators tend to look upon causation's
"mystifying riddles" as "the last refuge of muddy thinkers,"' 3 a few brave souls
I See, e.g., William Landes & Richard A Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of
Negligence, 69 IowA L. REV. 363 (1984).
6 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams et al., At the End of Palsgraf, There is Chaos: An Assessment
of Proximate Cause in Light of Chaos Theory, 59 U. PIrr. L. REV. 507 (1998).
7 See generally H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 84 (2d ed. 1985)
("The most important modern literature on causation in the law is concerned almost exclu-
sively with the extent of liability for the tort of negligence.").
8 See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 7.01, at 7-5
(2d ed. 1999).
9 See, e.g., Peter C. Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 147, 149
(2000). "Proximate cause is a factor in all three types of civil actions seeking damages:
common law torts, common law contract, and statutory. However, tort actions have been the
subject of most of the judicial and scholarly attention devoted to proximate cause." Id. at
149. See also infra note 67 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471,
471-72 (1950):
Having no integrated meaning of its own, [proximate cause's] chameleon quality permits it to be
substituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that element
becomes difficult .... No court that takes refuge in "proximate cause" can ever be convicted of
error except by a higher court that does likewise.... No other formula ... so nearly does the
work of Aladdin's lamp.
' See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). See generally infra
notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918). See generally
infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Kenneth Vinson, Proximate Cause Should be Barred from Wandering Outside
Negligence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 215 (1985) ("In tort law's darkest corner lurks the
concept of proximate cause. Causation's mystifying riddles constitute the last refuge of
muddy thinkers .... When lawyers and judges toss causation rhetoric into briefs and opin-
[Vol. 2:351
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nevertheless have attempted to analyze and define legal causation principles in
tort law, beginning with significant and authoritative causation articles written
by Professor Joseph H. Beale 4 and his former law student James A. McLaugh-
lin 1 5 in the 1920s; continuing with insightful articles by Charles E. Carpenter
1 6
and William Lloyd Prosser 7 in the 1930s; including reevaluations of legal cau-
sation written by Professors William Lloyd Prosser 8 and Fleming James Jr.19
during the 1950s; and culminating in a number of more recent contemporary
causation articles written in the 1980s and 1990s2 0 and at the beginning of the
new millennium.t
A. Causation in Fact ("But For" Causation)
Initially, a number of early commentators attempted to find some underly-
ing meaning to the legal causation enigma that had been so "overworked" by
the courts. 22 First, they defined causation in fact to mean causation sine qua
non, "that is, if the harm would not have happened but for the act, the act in
fact caused the damage."23 Or, stated a little differently, "but for the defen-
ions, the resulting babble smothers common sense and further corrupts legal English."). So
Professor Vinson's article arguably targets me a double-dipper "muddy thinker" because not
only am I writing about legal causation issues, but I am also "wandering outside negligence
law" into the legal abyss of causation issues inherent in insurance coverage disputes. See
also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14 Beale, supra note 4.
15 McLaughlin, supra note 4.
16 Carpenter, supra note 4.
7 Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, supra note 4.
8 Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, supra note 4.
19 James & Perry, supra note 4.
20 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 4; HART & HONORE, supra note 7; Kelley, supra note 4.
21 See, e.g., John F. Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort
Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HAv. L. REV. 690 (2001).
22 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 151-53:
Probably few students of [legal causation] would disagree with the statement that the law of
proximate causation has been overworked in the cases. Many decisions speaking of proximate
cause seem much more satisfactorily rationalized by disposing of them on the ground that there
was no breach of duty by the defendant, that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent; or that
there was no causation in fact, proximate or otherwise .... So many cases say that the defendant
was not the proximate cause when some other bar to liability is much more easily and satisfacto-
rily applicable [and] this caution can be emphasized scarcely enough.
See also Carpenter, supra note 4, at 246:
There has been a tendency on the part of courts to overwork proximate cause. Frequently courts
attempt to determine liability by means of the formula of proximate cause when resort should
have been made to some other requisite or prerequisite of legal liability. Such cases are not
useful authorities on proximate cause.
And see James & Perry, supra note 4, at 761:
In the progress of negligence law .. .the concept of proximate cause has been greatly over-
worked to limit or control both the liability of the defendant and the effect of contributory negli-
gence because of many considerations which can be treated in a more meaningful and significant
way in connection with other issues, such as that of duty, standard of conduct, and the like.
See generally LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 78, 122 et seq. (1927).
23 McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 153.
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dant's act, the consequence in question would not have occurred."'24 The major
problem with causation in fact standing alone, however, is the problem of
unlimited causal liability often based upon remote causation. According to Pro-
fessor Carpenter, this cause in fact test "would often impose liability for acts
very remote in time or space, and where the defendant's act was a most insig-
nificant and incidental factor. It would frequently require the imposition of lia-
bility in cases where it would be absurd to do so."'25 Likewise, Professor
Fleming James Jr. noted that this legal causation test:
includes a requirement that the wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact of the harm;
but if this stood alone the scope of liability would be vast indeed, for "the causes of
causes [are] infinite" - "the fatal trespass done by Eve was the cause of all our woe."
But the law has not stopped there - it has developed further restrictions and limita-
tions. The concept this development has produced is generally called "proximate" or
"legal" cause.
26
A second important legal concept involving causation in fact involves
multiple concurrent causation and the substantial factor rule. The substantial
factor rule may be briefly summarized as follows: if two [or more] causes
concur to bring about an event and either one of them, operating alone, would
have been sufficient to cause the identical result, then each cause in fact has
played so important a part in producing the result that legal responsibility
should be imposed upon it as a "substantial factor" of the ultimate result.
27
For example, if a defendant sets a fire which merges with another fire from
some other source, and the combined fires destroy plaintiffs property - but
either fire would have done it alone - then defendant's act is a "substantial
factor" of plaintiffs loss. 28 Case law in a majority of states today broadly
recognizes this "substantial factor" concept,29 and it has likewise been incorpo-
rated into the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3" So although the "substantial
24 Carpenter, supra note 4, at 235. See also James & Perry, supra note 4, at 762-83; and
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 263-72.
25 Carpenter, supra note 4, at 235.
26 James & Perry, supra note 4, at 761.
27 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 4, at 242-44; and PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra
note 3, at 265-68. See also 3 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ANDREW W.
GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §11:2, at 384-87 (1986).
28 See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45
(Minn. 1920). The court was no doubt influenced by the "substantial factor" test suggested
by Professor Jeremiah Smith in Legal Causes of Actions in Torts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 101,
223, 229 (1911). See also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 267 n.29.
29 See, e.g., Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co. Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (1999) (holding that
the "substantial factor" standard of proving causation is a relatively broad one, requiring
only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.
Thus, a force that plays only an infinitesimal or theoretical part in bringing about an injury or
loss, is not a substantial factor). See also Sharp v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 569 P.2d 178,
181 (Alaska 1977); Ekberg v. Greene, 588 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1979); Flom v. Flom, 291
N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980); Clark v. Leisure Vehicles Inc., 292 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Wis.
1980).
30 THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) states that an actor's negligent con-
duct is a legal cause of harm to another if his or her conduct is a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the harm. See also Thacker v. UNR Indus. Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1992)
(holding that under the "substantial factor" test of the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS
§ 431, the defendant's conduct is said to be the cause of the event if it was a material
[Vol. 2:351
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factor" rule may not be completely synonymous with the "but for" rule, many
courts nevertheless usually lump these two rules together in determining causa-
tion in fact.
31
B. Proximate (or Legal) Cause
Since "but for" causation, standing alone, would often impose liability for
remote and insignificant causes,3 2 there remains the crucial question of whether
or not the actor should be legally liable for such injury or loss; and whether the
defendant's conduct has been "so significant and important a cause that the
defendant should be legally responsible. 3 3 The concept of proximate or legal
cause therefore involves a limitation of liability for public policy reasons.34
For example, assume that sparks from a negligently managed railroad engine
set fire to plaintiffs woodshed, then to plaintiffs house, then to a number of
other houses, and then to the whole town. Clearly the defendant would be the
cause in fact for all of the concurrent fire losses in a causal chain of events.
But should the defendant be legally liable as the proximate cause for all the
resulting fire losses? In the classic causation case of Ryan v. New York Central
Railroad Co.,35 the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant rail-
road company's legal liability was limited only to the first building, and that the
"second, third, or twenty-fourth" buildings destroyed by the resulting fire were
"too remote" to constitute legal liability under New York proximate cause
law. 36 Likewise, in the more recent case of Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,37 the
New York Court of Appeals again held, for public policy reasons, that proxi-
mate cause limited the recovery of persons who were injured by the miscar-
element and a substantial factor in bringing the event about; in other words, the test requires
that the alleged tortfeasor's conduct be somehow "responsible" for producing the injury at
issue).
31 See, e.g., Sharp, 569 P.2d at 180 ("Normally, in order to satisfy the substantial factor test
it must be shown both that the accident would not have happened 'but for' the defendant's
negligence and that the negligent act was so important in bringing about the injury that
reasonable men [and women] would regard it as a cause and attach responsibility to it.").
See also SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 27, at 386-87.
32 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
33 See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 42, at 243.
34 Id. at 243:
This is not a question of causation, or even a question of fact; but quite far removed from both
.... The term "proximate cause" is applied by the courts to those more or less undefined
considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly established.
35 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
36 Id. New York courts later modified this rule to allow recovery for the first adjoining
landowner as distinct from the first building. See Webb v. Rome, W. & 0. R. Co., 49 N.Y.
420 (1872). But see also Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354
(1874), where the Kansas Supreme Court held that the owner of a farm nearly four miles
away from site where the fire originally began did have a valid cause of action against the
railroad company under proximate cause principles, and finding that the loss of the farm
property was not a remote or unforeseeable consequence. This judicial perception of proxi-
mate cause in a largely rural and agricultural state, versus the differing perceptions of proxi-
mate cause limitations of liability in a more urbanized and industrialized state (as well as the
corporate headquarters of the New York Central Railroad Company) suggest different under-
lying public policy rationales supporting each judicial decision.
37 568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1991).
Summer 2002]
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riage preventative drug DES only to those mothers who ingested DES and to
their children who were injured by in utero exposure to DES, even though "the
rippling effects of DES exposure may extend for generations"; since it "is our
duty to confine liability within manageable limits."
38
A central element of proximate causation from early Anglo-American law
to the present era involves the concept of foreseeability.39 Foreseeability is
framed by some courts within the concept of duty,4 ° and is framed by other
courts within the concept of proximate cause," or a combination of these two
concepts.4 2
For example, in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. ,3 arguably the most
celebrated (and, some would argue, the most notorious) torts case in American
jurisprudence,' the New York Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting conclu-
sions as to whether proximate cause should be characterized in terms of duty to
an unforeseeable plaintiff, or whether proximate cause should more properly be
based upon foreseeable or unforeseeable causal consequences. The facts
presented before the court were these. A passenger was running to catch one of
defendant's trains in a railroad station. Defendant's guards, attempting to assist
the passenger in boarding the train, negligently dislodged a package from the
passenger's arms, causing it to fall on the rails. The package contained fire-
works, which exploded with some violence. The concussion allegedly over-
38 Id. at 555.
39 Baron Pollock, whose work on tort law was long the leading British authority on the
subject, for example, insisted that the extent of liability for negligence was measured by
what was foreseeable at the time of the act or omission complained of. See POLLOCK, TORTS
8, 24 (14th ed. 1939). See also James & Perry, supra note 4, at 785-801; PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 272-80.
40 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) [Palsgraf-Cardozo].
See also Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary Sch. Dist., 595 P.2d 1017, 1021-22 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that foreseeability "is not only involved in the determination of proximate
cause, it is also one of the yardsticks by which duty is measured."); George Hormel & Co. v.
Maez, 155 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (Ct. App. 1979) ("Certainly, the most important consideration
in determining whether a duty exists is whether the harm suffered was foreseeable to the
defendant. The most important of these considerations in establishing duty is foreseeability.
As a general principle, a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably
endangered by his conduct.").
41 See, e.g., Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 (dissenting opinion) (Palsgraf-Andrews). See also
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lippincott, 383 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980) ("A
foreseeable consequence is one which a prudent man [or woman] would anticipate as likely
to result from an act."); Meadowlark Farms Inc. v. Warken, 376 N.E.2d 122, 129 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978) ("Factual causation becomes proximate causation under the test of foreseeabil-
ity.").
42 For a good overview of how American courts have characterized and employed the tort
law concept of foreseeability, see generally Annotation, Foreseeability as an element of
negligence and proximate cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 (1965) and Later Case Service (Cum.
Supp. 2001).
41 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), reargument denied, 164 N.E. 564 (N.Y. 1928).
44 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 284 ("[Palsgraf] has become
the most discussed and debated of all torts cases, and over which the argument still goes
on."); SPEISER, KRAUSER & GANS, supra note 27, §11:7, at 400 ("The Palsgraf case is
probably the most celebrated of all American tort cases. Certainly it is the most debated,
most argued decision wrestled with by virtually all scholars, commentators, pundits, and
legal philosophers.").
[Vol. 2:351
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turned some scales "many feet" from where the package fell, which in turn
injured Mrs. Palsgraf, a prospective railroad passenger, who had bought a ticket
and was waiting on the station platform for another train to depart.45
In a 4-3 New York Court of Appeals decision written by then Judge Ben-
jamin Cardozo speaking for the majority, the court defined proximate cause in
terms of duty. Negligence, wrote Cardozo, "imports a term of relation; it is a
risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension ' 46 and conse-
quently no duty would be owed to an "unforeseeable" plaintiff such as Mrs.
Palsgraf.47 The Restatement of Torts (to which Cardozo conveniently served as
an Adviser) Section 281, comment c "almost immediately afterward" accepted
Cardozo's view in the Palsgraf case that there is no duty, and hence there is no
negligence and no liability, to an unforeseeable plaintiff who is not within a
foreseeable "zone of danger."4 8
Three judges, however, dissented in Palsgraf in an equally persuasive
opinion written by Judge Andrews. Judge Andrews voiced the traditional view
that proximate causation "is a term of convenience, of public policy, of a rough
sense of justice." Hence:
[d]ue care is a duty imposed upon each one of us to protect society from unnecessary
danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone.... Not only is he wronged to whom harm
might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured even if he
be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone.
4 9
Andrews therefore characterized proximate cause more in terms of fore-
seeability of harm and causation rather than as a duty to the plaintiff.5" Not
surprisingly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts also adopted Judge Andrews'
rationale of proximate cause as well.5 t
Which is the better reasoned view? A number of other influential tort
cases appear to follow Andrews' more traditional direct versus indirect harm
rationale for proximate causation, rather than Cardozo's duty-relation-risk
formula. For example, the theory of direct causation was applied with a ven-
4 But see also PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, TORTS 311 (10th ed. 2000):
A study of the record in this case indicates that as described in the opinion, the event could not
possibly have happened [that way]. These were apparently ordinary fireworks, not bombs... An
appreciable interval elapsed after the first noise and smoke, during which Mrs. Palsgraf said to
her daughter, "Elizabeth, turn your back." Then "the scale blew and hit me in the side." The
platform was crowded, and there was no evidence of any other damage to anybody or anything.
Plaintiffs original complaint, before amendment, alleged that the scale was knocked over by a
stampede of frightened passengers .... [Also] Plaintiff on a motion for reargument pointed out
that Mrs. Palsgraf stood much closer to the scene of the explosion than the majority opinion
would suggest ....
And see William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953).
46 162 N.E. at 100.
41 See also SPEISER, KRAUSER & GANS, supra note 27, § 11.7, at 403 ("Cardozo suggested
that the existence of duties in negligence turned on foreseeability, as determined by physical
proximity [or a so-called "zone of danger].").
48 See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 285. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 281, cmt g.
49 162 N.E. at 103 (emphasis added).
50 Id. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 435. See also supra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
Summer 2002]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Nev. L.J. 357 2002
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
geance in the English case of In re Polemis.52 In Polemis, a plank negligently
dropped by one of defendant's workman into the hold of the ship created a
spark that exploded gasoline vapor in the hold, which in turn destroyed the ship
and its cargo. Although arbitrators found that this loss was not a foreseeable
result of defendant's negligence, Lord Justice Bankes in his Polemis decision
disagreed. Utilizing a direct causation rationale, Lord Justice Bankes held that
the negligent dropping of the plank was the proximate cause of the loss by fire,
even though the defendant could not have foreseen the exact harm that it would
cause.
53
The Polemis case, however, was later overruled by two other "British
Boat Cases," Wagon Mound No. 1,54 and Wagon Mound No. 2.55 In Wagon
Mound No. 1 the crew of an oil tanker negligently allowed furnace oil from
their ship to overflow into Sydney Harbor in Australia, where it flowed to and
under the plaintiffs dock, some 600 feet away. Plaintiffs workmen were using
torches to repair the dock, and molten metal falling from the dock ignited cot-
ton waste floating on the oil. The waste acted as a wick for the molten metal,
which in turn ignited the oil, and burned the dock. The Wagon Mound court
repudiated the "direct causation" rule of Polemis, and adopted a limitation to
liability based on foreseeability of the risk. Six years later, in Wagon Mound
No. 2, involving damage to other ships in Sydney Harbor from the same defen-
dant's acts, the Privy Council further discussed the various elements that had to
be proven in determining such foreseeablility of harm. In this particular case,
the plaintiff was able to show through a preponderance of the evidence that the
ship's engineer should have known that it was possible to ignite this type of oil
on the water, and accordingly the type of damage in Wagon Mound No. 2 was
foreseeable, and therefore defendant's negligent conduct was the proximate
cause of the damage to the ships. So six years after the original Wagon Mound
case, the plaintiffs finally "got it right," and were able to demonstrate the nec-
essary degree of foreseeability to establish the causal nexus to defendant's
negligence.
So query: why did Cardozo insist on applying a duty-relation-risk formula
to proximate cause instead of applying the more traditional - and more gener-
ally accepted - direct and foreseeable causation formula as expounded by
Judge Andrews and a majority of other courts? According to Professor Jerry
Phillips:
Why does Cardozo confuse generations of law students by talking about duty instead
of foreseeability? Is it because New York was stuck with the direct-cause rule of
proximate causation, and he wanted to avoid applying the rule? Then why not change
the rule, from direct cause (Polemis) to foreseeability (Wagon Mound), instead of
talking about duty? Of course Cardozo was not the first to confuse duty with proxi-
mate cause.
5 6
52 In re Arbitration Between Polemis and Funess, Withy & Co. Ltd., 3 K.B. 560 (Court of
Appeal 1921).
53 Id.
51 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Eng'g Co. Ltd. ("Wagon Mound No.
1"), [1961] A.C. 388 (Privy Council 1961).
15 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. ("Wagon Mound No. 2"), [1967]
1 A.C. 617 (Privy Council 1966).
56 Jerry L. Phillips, Law School Teaching, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 725, 727 (2001).
[Vol. 2:351
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The American analogy to Wagon Mound arguably can be found in the
Kinsman cases, 57 where employees of the Kinsman Transit Company improp-
erly moored a ship, the Shivas, at a dock in the Buffalo River, three miles
above a lift bridge maintained by the city of Buffalo. Due to ice and debris in
the river, the mooring lines pulled out from the improperly anchored mooring
block. The Shivas broke loose and drifted downstream, colliding with another
ship, the Tewksbury, and both ships went down the river together toward the
bridge. Frantic telephone calls to workers on the bridge to raise it in time for
the ships went unanswered since one bridge crew had gone off duty, and the
other bridge crew was late. The ships crashed into the center of the bridge,
causing it to collapse, backing up the river, and causing extensive property
damage up and down the river. The trial court found negligence and liability on
the part of Kinsman and the City of Buffalo, and the appellate court affirmed.
Judge Friendly stated:
The weight of authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to conse-
quences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are
"direct," and the damage, although other and greater than expectable, is of the same
general sort that was risked .... Other American courts, purporting to apply a test of
foreseeability to damages, extend that concept to such unforeseen lengths as to raise
serious doubt whether the concept is meaningful; indeed we wonder whether the
British courts are not finding it necessary to limit the language of the Wagon Mound
[cases] .... [Most courts realize] however that there must be some limitation to this.
"Somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the [causal] link has
become too tenuous - that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity"....58
Judge Friendly's concern was that some American courts may extend the
test of foreseeability "to such unforeseen lengths as to raise serious doubt
whether the concept is meaningful." A number of American courts, for exam-
ple, have made a distinction in determining foreseeability between the particu-
lar manner of harm and the general type of harm, as proposed by Professors
Fowler Harper and Fleming James Jr. in their influential torts treatise.5 9 The
57 See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1964) ("Kinsman No. 1");
and Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Kinsman No. 2").
58 338 F.2d at 724-25. Professor Prosser analyzes the two Kinsman cases in this manner:
The [first Kinsman] court, bound by New York law, proceeded to limit the Palsgraf rule by
holding that if any harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, the defendant was liable for unforesee-
able consequences to the plaintiff. In the second [Kinsman] case [388 F.2d 821] the action was
for pecuniary loss due to the necessity of transporting ship cargoes around the jam. The court
was unwilling to hold that there could be no liability for pecuniary loss caused by negligence,
and held instead that the connection between the negligence and these damages was too "tenuous
and remote" to permit recovery. Just what this may mean would appear to be anybody's guess.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 43, at 297.
59 See, e.g., 4 FOWLER HARPER, FLEMING JAMES JR. & OSCAR GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS
(2d ed. 1986) § 20.5, at 162-63 ("Foreseeability does not mean that the precise hazard or the
exact consequences that were encountered should have been foreseen."). Professors Harper
and James argued for a more expansive application of proximate cause and foreseeability to
many tort law disputes:
As the fact of insurance and loss distribution increasingly permeates our system and the impor-
tance of individual blameworthiness wanes, the limitations (of proximate cause, or duty, etc.)
may be expected to take on more and more the character of limitations measured by what is felt
to be normally incidental to the kind of activity or enterprise that is footing the bill ....
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celebrated "flaming rat" case6" is one such illustration. In this case, the defen-
dant told his employee to clean a coin-operated machine with gasoline in a
small room where there was a lighted gas heater nearby with an open flame.
While the plaintiff was cleaning the machine with gasoline, a rat escaped from
under the machine, and ran to take refuge under the heater, where its fur, now
impregnated with gasoline fumes, caught fire from the flame. The rat then
"returned in haste and flames to its original hideout" under the coin-operated
machine, which then exploded in flames, injuring the plaintiff. The court held
that although the particular manner of harm was unforeseeable (i.e. a "flaming
rat" returning to his hideout under the coin-operated machine) nevertheless the
general type of harm was foreseeable (i.e. that the use of gasoline near to an
open flame may foreseeably cause an explosion and fire).6 1
Another equally bizarre case involved an eleven-year-old boy who was
riding a canister vacuum cleaner as if it were a toy car. His penis slipped
through an opening in the canister casing, and was amputated by the vacuum
cleaner fan blades traveling at 20,000 revolutions per minute. Although the
particular manner of harm was unforeseeable (as almost everyone would agree
in analyzing the facts of this particular case) the general type of harm - the
possibility of cutting off one's finger or another appendage from the unpro-
tected fan blades - was foreseeable.62  Accordingly, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, Section 435, has attempted to provide some flexible parameters
regarding the foreseeability of harm and the manner of its occurrence:
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or
the manner in with it occurred does not prevent him from being liable [but]
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where
after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it
appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the
harm.
63
What is foreseeable harm, and what is highly extraordinary conduct,
therefore, still may be subject to judicial discretion, despite the philosophical
differences among various academic lawyers. 4
Id. at 131. Professor Prosser, like Judge Friendly, was more skeptical of Harper and James'
more expansive approach to proximate cause and foreseeability. "Harper and James' tort
treatise is impressive and comprehensive," he told our law school Torts class, "but it can be
summarized in one sentence: The Plaintiff always wins."
60 United Novelty Co. v. Daniels, 42 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1949).
61 Id.
62 See Larue v. Nat'l Union Elec. Corp., 571 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1978).
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435.
4 Professors Harper and James expressed the following opinion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 435:
The formula chosen by the Restatement in its sections on proximate cause, with its emphasis on
what seems "extraordinary" in the light of hindsight, seems to abandon the foreseeability test.
But careful analysis shows that it does not. "When we have hindsight nothing is extraordinary,
for we can see each step following inevitably on the other ... " The proposed test probably does,
however, amount to an invitation to take a broad view towards what is foreseeable. The same is
probably true of the use of the word normal (rather than foreseeable or probable) as the opposite
of extraordinary. It is too bad that this formula was not used in defining the negligence issues
where such consideration more appropriately belongs.
[Vol. 2:351
HeinOnline  -- 2 Nev. L.J. 360 2002
INSURANCE CA USATION ISSUES
Finally, general rules of proximate causation also recognize that there may
be an unforeseeable intervening, superceding cause that may cut off the liabil-
ity of an original tortfeasor whenever the intervening cause was an unforesee-
able intentional or criminal act, rather than a "normal" intervening cause.65
III. LEGAL CAUSATION IN INSURANCE LAW
Since most research and analysis of legal causation issues have largely
occurred in the context of tort law,6 6 many courts applied these "classic tort"
proximate cause principles to insurance contract disputes as well. Indeed, an
early commentator noted that:
Among the decided cases, it is generally taken to be beyond dispute that proximate
cause is proximate cause, whenever it may be found, and the court is content with a
brief definition in the traditional [tort] manner. The rule in insurance cases appears
to be that the definition of proximate cause which should be applied is the same or
substantially the same as in negligence cases.
6 7
However, a growing body of case law and legal commentary 68 has demon-
strated many important differences, as well as similarities, between legal causa-
tion issues in tort and insurance law. Indeed, the general rules of proximate
causation are applied quite differently in insurance law, than for a general
breach of contract suit or a tort action, since the term itself arguably has a
different - and more literal - meaning in insurance cases than in tort or other
contract disputes. 69 According to Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the 1950 case of
Standard Oil Co. v. United States:
70
Unlike obligations flowing from duties imposed upon people willy-nilly, an insur-
ance policy is a voluntary undertaking by which obligations are voluntarily assumed.
HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 59, § 20.5, at 168. This was another "dig" at Professor
Prosser, who was the Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Apparently there
was little love lost between Professor Prosser and Professor James on the issue of proximate
cause in particular, and tort law in general.
65 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 44, at 301-19. This concept,
in itself, is worthy of assessment (and reassessment) in a separate law review article, or
number of articles. To quote Scarlett O'Hara, 'There will always be a tomorrow."
66 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
67 William C. Brewer, Jr., Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV.
1141, 1167 (1961). See also JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT Dis-
PuTEs §§ 7.01-7.04 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2001) (discussing causation in insurance law).
68 See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 67; Sidney I. Simon, Proximate Cause in Insurance, 10
AM. Bus. L.J. 33 (1972-73); Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy
Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 THE FORUM 385 (1985); Douglas Houser &
Christopher Kent, Concurrent Causation in First-Party Insurance Claims: Consumers Can-
not Afford Concurrent Causation, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 573 (1985-86); Craig Litsey, Prop-
erty Insurance Coverage and Policy Exclusions: Problems of Multiple Causation, 35 FED.
INS. COUNSEL Q. 415 (1985); Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20
CONN. L. REV. 569 (1987-88); Douglas G. Houser, The Rise and Fall of Concurrent Causa-
tion: Background and Current Trends Affecting Property Insurance Coverage, 44 FED. INS.
& CORP. CouNS. Q. 3 (1993); Mark D. Wurefel & Mark Koop, "Efficient Proximate Causa-
tion" in the Context of Property Insurance Claims, 65 DEF. CouNs. J. 400 (1998); Peter C.
Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 147 (2000).
69 Simon, supra note 68, at 35.
70 340 U.S. 54 (1950).
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Therefore the subtleties and sophistries of tort liability for negligence are not to be
applied in construing the covenants of [an insurance] policy. It is one thing for the
law to impose liability by its own notions of responsibility [as in a tort context] and
quite another to construe the scope of engagements bought and paid for [as in an
insurance context].71
Professor Banks McDowell also distinguishes between the prima facie
elements to establish a typical tort action, and the necessary elements in an
insurance coverage dispute. In order to establish a bona fide tort cause of
action, according to Professor Prosser, the plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that: (1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty of due care rec-
ognized by the law, requiring defendant to conform to a certain standard of
conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risk; (2) defendant
breached this duty of due care to the plaintiff; (3) defendant's acts were the
causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; that is to say,
the cause in fact and the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss; and (4) actual loss
or damage occurred to plaintiff as a result of defendant's actions.72  In insur-
ance situations, however, argues Professor McDowell, the following four dif-
ferent factors need to be considered: (1) the coverage provisions of an
insurance policy (or more generally, the promise in the contract); (2) the occur-
rence of the event (or more generally in contract, the breach); (3) the loss or
damage; and (4) the "connector" between the event and the lOSS. 7 3  Note that
Professor Prosser and Professor McDowell both speak of these respective cau-
sation requirements as a "connector" or "connection" between the occurrence
and the loss. So there are also important similarities, as well as important dif-
ferences, within this tort/contract causal conundrum.
How "proximate" must this causal "connector" actually be in insurance
law? According to one commentator:
The insurance rule is that only the proximate cause of the loss, and not the remote
cause, is to be regarded in determining whether recovery may be had under an insur-
ance policy, and that loss must have been proximately caused by a peril insured
against. If the nearest efficient cause of a loss is indeed one of the perils insured
against, the court need look no further. [But the] insurer is not relieved from respon-
71 Id. at 66. See also McDowell, supra note 68, at 574:
[T]he allocation of causal responsibility [in contract and insurance cases] ... is reinforced by the
fact that the contracting parties, like many tort theorists, share the wish to avoid the costs and
uncertainties of litigation about "proximate cause." Unlike the parties in tort contexts, where
neither can control or bargain from the position of victim or actor, the contracting parties can
define their obligation in ways that successfully avoid [or attempt to avoid] causation litigation.
And see Bragg, supra note 68, at 386:
[P]roximate cause has a different meaning in insurance cases than it has in tort cases. In tort
cases the rules of proximate cause are applied for the single purpose of fixing culpability, and for
that reason the rules reach back to both the injury and the physical cause to fix the blame on
those who created the situation in which the physical laws of nature operated; in insurance cases
the concern is not with the question of culpability or why the injury occurred, but only with the
nature of the injury and how it happened.
72 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 164-65.
73 McDowell, supra note 68, at 575. McDowell goes on to state that causation "should be
limited to the connector between what, consistent with insurance terminology, may be called
an "occurrence," and the loss suffered by the insured .... " Id. at 575-76.
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sibility by showing that the property was brought within the peril so insured against
by a cause not mentioned in the insurance policy.
An insurer may contract for a more limited liability in insuring a risk, but it is
up to him to express it with precision. Doubts in the contract he writes are
resolved against him, especially where he purportedly attempts to exclude
losses partially attributable to causes other than those insured against. Where
two concurrent causes unite in a result, the question of proximate cause in
insurance is not necessarily settled by testing whether the result would have
followed "but for" the other contributing cause. Rather, the court asks, for
instance, in an accident insurance case, was the woman insured's fall or her
pregnancy the efficient predominant and thus proximate cause of her miscar-
riage, the one that necessarily sets the other causes in motion ....
The proximate cause of loss or damage to an insured's property or injury to his
person is not necessarily the last link in the chain of preceding events, but the
procuring, efficient cause from which the effect might be expected to follow
without concurrence of any unforeseen circumstances. 4
This "general rule" of insurance proximate causation, however, is not as
simple and as straightforward as Professor Simon suggests, and requires further
analysis and inquiry into its underlying rationale, justification, and applicabil-
ity. And, once again, where we must begin our initial inquiry into insurance
proximate causation is - like proximate causation in tort law - with Benjamin
Cardozo.
A. Benjamin Cardozo and Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
If the fact situation in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.7 5 is a tort
professor's dream,76 then the fact situation in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.77 is an insurance law professor's dream, and it remains, after so
many years, my favorite insurance causation case.7 8 The facts of Bird are as
follows. Like Polemis, Wagon Mound, and the Kinsman cases,79 the Bird case
involved a damaged vessel, which was insured under a marine and fire insur-
ance policy by the St. Paul Insurance Company. On the night of July 30, 1916,
a fire broke out from an unknown cause beneath some railroad freight cars in
New York harbor. The railroad cars were loaded with explosives, and after the
fire had burned for approximately thirty minutes, the contents of the cars
exploded. This explosion caused another fire, which in turn caused another and
much greater explosion of a large quantity of dynamite and other explosives
stored in the freight yard. This last explosion caused a concussion of air, which
damaged plaintiff's vessel about 1000 feet distant, to the extent of $675. No
14 Simon, supra note 68, at 35-36.
75 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 285: "What the Palsgraf case
actually did was to submit to the nation's then most excellent state court a law professor's
dream of an examination question .
77 120 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918).
78 I need to point this fact out, since this Symposium is about our favorite insurance law
cases. I originally intended only to discuss the Bird case, but one thing led to another, and I
expanded this article more than I originally intended.
79 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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fire reached the vessel, the damages being solely from the concussion caused
by the second explosion. The question for then Judge Cardozo was whether
this loss was covered under the fire insurance policy provisions.80 Although
Cardozo conceded that there "is no doubt when fire spreads to an insured build-
ing and there causes an explosion, the insurer is liable for all damages"81 and
although the trial court had found for the plaintiff, Cardozo nevertheless
reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant insurer largely based on
insurance law proximate cause principles.
Initially, Cardozo's reasoning appeared to parallel a direct-versus-indirect-
cause type of argument utilized in Polemis82 and Palsgraf-Andrews. 8 3 First,
Cardozo opined that the damage to the vessel constituted "damage by concus-
sion; and concussion is not fire nor the immediate consequences of fire." '84
Then Cardozo discussed the important proximate cause issues involved in this
particular case:
We must put ourselves in the place of the average owner whose boat or building is
damaged by the concussion of a distant explosion, let us say a mile away. Some
glassware in his pantry is thrown down and broken. It would probably never occur to
him that, within the meaning of the policy of insurance, he had suffered loss by fire.
A philosopher or a lawyer might persuade him that he had, but he would not believe
it until they told him. He would expect indemnity, of course, if fire reached the thing
insured. He would expect indemnity, very likely, if the fire was near at hand, if his
boat or his building was within the danger zone of ordinary experience, if damage of
some sort, whether from ignition or from the indirect consequences of fire, might
fairly be said to be in the range of normal apprehension. But a different case presents
itself when the fire is at all times so remote that there is never exposure to its direct
perils, and that exposure to its indirect perils comes only through the presence of
extraordinary conditions, the release and intervention of tremendous forces of
destruction.
The case comes, therefore, to this. Fire must reach the thing insured, or come
within such proximity to it that damage, direct or indirect, is within the com-
pass of reasonable probability. Then only is it the proximate cause, because
then only may we suppose that it was within the contemplation of the contract.
In the last analysis, therefore, it is something in the minds of men, in the will of
the contracting parties, and not merely in the physical bond of union between
events, which solves, at least for the jurist, this problem of causation.8 5
Here, then, was the underlying rationale - and the genius - of Cardozo's
proximate cause analysis of this particular insurance law dispute. Proximate
cause in insurance law should not be determined through an objective tort test
of foreseeable harm, as analyzed in the Wagon Mound and Kinsman cases. 86
Rather, proximate cause in insurance coverage disputes should be determined
according to the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties:
80 120 N.E. at 86.
81 Id.
82 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
83 Indeed, Judge Andrews cited Cardozo's Bird decision in support of his dissenting opinion
in Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 104; as well as citing to the Polemis case. Id. at 103.
84 120 N.E. at 87.
85 Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
86 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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General definitions of a proximate cause give little aid. Our guide is the reasonable
expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when making a business con-
tract. It is his intention, express or fairly to be inferred that counts.
87
This evolutionary-some would say revolutionary-definition of proximate
cause principles in an insurance law context, applicable to both the insured and
insurer alike,88 arguably was an important precursor to Professor Arthur L.
Corbin's famous first maxim of contract law: "The Main Purpose of Contract
Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises.'"89
Moreover, Cardozo's contractually based "reasonable expectations" doctrine
enunciated in Bird arguably led to an increased utilization of important insur-
ance law interpretive rules in order to determine the scope of the parties' intent,
contractual duties and obligations, and the meaning of disputed terms in an
insurance contract, through a number of contractually based "reasonable expec-
tations" rights and remedies including: (1) the doctrine of ambiguities; (2) con-
tract unconscionability and public policy issues; (3) equitable remedies such as
waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and contract reforma-
tion; and (4) a number of other interpretive rules applied to standardized insur-
ance contracts as contracts of adhesion.9 ° Indeed, this contractually based
"reasonable expectations" doctrine was firmly established at the time Professor
(now Judge) Robert Keeton propounded his ground-breaking 1970 "rights at
variance with policy language" "reasonable expectations" doctrine.9 '
87 120 N.E. at 87 (emphasis added). See also Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian
Bog: The Evolution of Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IowA L. REv. 173, 265 (2000):
In Cardozo's view [in Bird] the problem of causation was not to be addressed as "one of philoso-
phy" but according to the reasonable expectations of the policyholder .... A few years later in
Goldstein v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. [140 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1923)] [Cardozo] used [this
case] to deny coverage where an insured had suffered one injury which in turn caused a second,
permanently disabling condition. Referring to Bird, he rejected the analogy to tort law proximate
cause (otherwise the plaintiff clearly would have prevailed) and instead relied on the parties'
[contractual] intentions to define the role of causation.
88 In a subsequent decision, Smith v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 159 N.E.
87, 93 (N.Y. 1927), Cardozo recognized that insurers as well as insureds could invoke this
contractually based "reasonable expectations" doctrine. See also Robert Jerry II, Insurance,
Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 32 (1998-99)
("Cardozo viewed reasonable expectations as a two-way street; each party was entitled to
assert them at the other. Thus, in an insurance setting, Cardozo thought it as important to
consider the reasonable expectations of insurers as it was to examine the expectations held
by the insureds.").
89 I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (1952). See also GORDON SCHARBER & CLAUDE
ROWHER, CONTRACTS §88, at 147 (3d ed. 1990) ("One purpose of contract law is to protect
the reasonable expectation of persons who become parties to the bargain.").
90 See generally Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000).
91 See Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961 (1970) (Part I); 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970) (Part II). As propounded by
Professor Keeton, this functional (as opposed to contractual) "reasonable expectations" doc-
trine is based upon a two-prong rationale: (1) that an insurer should be denied any uncon-
scionable advantage in an insurance contract; and (2) that the reasonable expectations of
insurance applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance coverage
should be honored, even though a painstaking study of the policy provisions contractually
would have negated those expectations. Id. at 963-64. A small minority of state courts today
have adopted this insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations at variance with the
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A final important causation issue for Benjamin Cardozo in the Bird case
had to do with his proximity and remoteness test. "Precedents are not lacking
for the recognition of the space element as a factor in causation," he wrote.
"This is true even in the law of torts where there is a tendency to go farther
back in the search for causes than there is in the law of contracts .... Espe-
cially in the law of insurance, the rule is "You are not to trouble yourself with
distant causes .... "92 So did Judge Cardozo employ a tort-oriented causal
chain of events analysis in the Bird case; a contractually-oriented remoteness in
space analysis; or both? The answer appears to be "both":
For our present purposes, it is enough that, alike in contract and in tort, contiguity or
remoteness in space may determine either the existence or the measure of liability. In
doubtful situations a jury must say where the line is to be drawn .... There is
nothing absolute in the legal estimation of causation. Proximity and remoteness are
relative and changing concepts. It may be said that these are vague tests, but so are
most distinctions of degree. On one hand, you have distances so great that as a matter
of law the cause becomes remote; on the other, spaces so short that as a matter of law
the cause is proximate .... Between these two extremes there is a borderland where
juries must resolve the doubt.9 3
B. "Immediate" Cause versus "Efficient" Proximate Cause
An important legacy of Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. is
the issue of whether the necessary causal nexus for an insurance loss needs to
be the immediate cause of the loss, or whether it can also be the "efficient" or
"dominant" proximate cause along a causal chain of events. American courts
have split on this important legal concept. The traditional insurance law rule,
apparently based on earlier English precedent, 94 is that the cause of loss in an
insurance law context must be the immediate cause of the injury, as opposed to
the proximate cause of the injury.95 The underlying rationale behind this
"immediate cause" test was explained in a 1950 Washington State Supreme
Court decision 96 in this manner:
insurance policy language. See generally Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Rea-
sonable Expectations After Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998-99). A majority of
courts, however, still recognize a contractually based insurance law doctrine of reasonable
expectations. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
92 120 N.E. at 88. Cardozo cited as authority for this "immediate cause" rule, Fenton v.
Thorley & Co., (1903) A.C. 443, 454:
In an action on [an insurance] policy, the causa proxima is alone considered in ascertaining the
cause of loss; but in cases of other contracts and in questions of tort the causa causans is by no
means disregarded. This rule "is based" it is said "on the intention of the parties." Reicher v.
Borwick, 1892, 2 Q.B. 550.
See also McDonald v. Snelling, 96 Mass. 290, 294 (1867) ("[C]ausa proxima, in suits for
damages at common law, extends to the natural and probable consequences of a breach of
contract or tort, while in insurance cases ... it is limited in the immediately operating cause
of the loss or damage.").
9 120 N.E. at 88 (citations omitted).
9 See supra note 92.
15 See, e.g., Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Co., 777 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989); Ovbey v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 726, 728-29 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Frontier Lanes,
v. Canadian Indem. Co., 613 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). See generally 1 ALLAN
D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 6.07, at 389-92 (3d ed. 1995).
96 Bruener v. Turin City Fire Ins. Co., 222 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1950).
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In the rare instances where proximate cause has any bearing in contract cases, it has a
different meaning than when used in tort .... In tort cases, the rules of proximate
cause are applied for the single purpose of fixing culpability, with which insurance
cases are not concerned. For that purpose, the tort rules of proximate cause reach
back [to] both the injury and the physical cause to fix the blame on those who created
the situation in which the physical laws of nature operated. The happening of an
accident does not, in itself, establish negligence and tort liability. The question is
always, why did the injury occur. Insurance cases are not concerned with why the
injury occurred or the question of culpability, but only with the nature of the injury
and how it happened.
97
This "immediate cause" rule, however, is not an inflexible or absolute
rule. The insurance policy language itself may require the application of a
"proximate cause" rule: in some cases, 9 8 and other circumstances may exist
where a strict application of the "immediate cause" rule would be unfair and
"contrary to common sense and reasonable judgment." For example, in the case
of Blaine Richards & Co. v. Marine Indemnity Insurance Co. of America,99 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
We do not agree that proximate cause in insurance matters is to be determined by
resort to "but for" causation. As this Circuit has noted, "the horrendous niceties of the
doctrine of so-called 'proximate cause' employed in negligence suits, apply in a lim-
ited manner to insurance policies." . . . At the same time, the single cause nearest to
the loss in time should not necessarily be found to be the proximate cause ....
Instead, in accord with the reasonable understanding and expectations of the parties
we must attempt to ascertain... "the predominant and determining".... cause of
t loss .... Determination of proximate cause in these cases is thus a matter of applying
common sense and reasonable judgment as to the source of the losses alleged. 1°
A growing number of American courts, however, has rejected the immedi-
ate cause rule in favor of an "efficient" or "dominant" proximate cause
rule. 10' Under this tort-oriented proximate cause rule, there will be coverage if
a risk of loss that is specifically insured against in the policy sets in motion, in
an unbroken sequence, the events that cause the ultimate loss, even though the
last "immediate cause" in the chain of causation is an excluded cause.'0 2 For
97 Id. at 834-35. Bruener, however, was subsequently overruled in Graham v. Pub.
Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash. 1983) which adopted the proximate
cause rule.
98 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815-16 (1973); Kane
v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768 P.2d 678, 684-85 (Colo. 1989).
99 635 F.2d 1051 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law).
'0o Id. at 1054-55 (citations omitted). See also John Dreenon & Sons v. N.H. Ins. Co., 637
S.W. 339, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (similar holding).
'' See, e.g., TNT Speed & Sport Ctr. Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731, 733 (8th
Cir. 1997) (applying Missouri law); Assurance Co. of Am. v. Jay-Mar, Inc. 38 F. Supp. 2d
349, 353-54 (D.N.J. 1999); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 667 (Vt.
1997). See generally STEMPEL, supra note 8, §7.02. Professor Stempel characterizes these
two inquiries as: (1) the cause nearest the loss; and (2) the dominant cause of the loss. Id.
§ 7-5.
102 See, e.g., Graham, 656 P.2d at 1081 (Where a peril specifically insured against sets
other causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence and connection between the act and
final loss, produce the result for which recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as the
proximate cause of the entire loss. It is the efficient or predominant cause which sets into
motion the chain of events producing the loss which is regarded as the proximate cause, not
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example, in the case of Safeco Insurance Co. v. Hirschmann, 103 wind and rain
caused a mudslide, resulting in extensive damage to the policyholder's prop-
erty. The court held that there was coverage, although damage from mudslides
was excluded under the policy, because "where a peril specifically insured
against sets other causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence and con-
nection between the act and final loss, produce the result for which recovery is
sought, the insured peril is regarded as the proximate cause of the entire
Which is the better-reasoned rule: the immediate cause rule or the proxi-
mate cause rule?
Clearly, the "immediate cause" rule cannot be applied in all circum-
stances, especially when it is unfair and contrary to the intent of the contracting
parties. On the other hand, the "efficient" or "dominant" proximate cause rule
should not be applied to insurance coverage disputes when the initial cause in
the causal chain of events is too remote. The better reasoned view, therefore,
in order to validate the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties, and
following the well-reasoned precedents found in the Bird, Blaine Richards, and
Hirschmann cases, would be to permit a court to apply either the "immediate
cause" rule or the "efficient" or "dominant" proximate cause rule according to
which rule would provide coverage in a particular insurance contract dispute,
especially if there was policy language that was arguably ambiguous.' 0 5
necessarily the last act in a chain of events); John Drennon & Sons Co., 637 S.W.2d at 341
(The direct cause of an event is that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any new cause, produces the event and without which the event would not have occurred.
"Direct" as used in an insurance policy relates to causal connection and is to be interpreted
as the immediate or proximate cause as distinguished from the remote cause. A cause is
proximate if it is the efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading
up to the damage, and which is a natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by a new and
independent cause, produced the damage. The product of two or more concurrent and con-
tributing causes is the direct result of each, although neither is the sole cause.).
1o3 760 P.2d 969 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
'04 Id. at 972-73.
105 See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 201, 206
(Wash. 1994). See also WINDT, supra note 95, at 623:
[W]hether a court applies the immediate cause rule [or the "efficient" or "dominant" proximate
cause rule] might depend upon whether one is considering a "cause" that would exclude cover-
age or one that would create coverage. If the policy language is ambiguous, a court should adopt
the immediate cause rule when the rule would serve to render an exclusion inapplicable, even
though the court would apply [the "efficient" or "dominant" proximate cause rule] when apply-
ing a policy provision extending coverage.
And see STEMPEL, supra note 101, at 7-9:
The common thread running through these decisions appears to be one in which courts are more
attracted to a strict proximity [or "immediate cause"] rule and focus on the cause physically
nearest the loss (the last event in the causal chain) where this benefits the policyholder in a
coverage dispute, either by bringing the claim within the scope of the policy, or avoiding the
potential application of an exclusion. Conversely, where the causes physically closest to the loss
are uncovered, courts will implicitly or expressly use ["efficient" or "dominant" proximate
cause] analysis to find a more remote but covered peril to constitute the "efficient proximate
cause" of the loss. Not surprisingly, the tendency is more pronounced where the potentially
excluding policy language is arguably ambiguous.
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C. Multiple Concurrent Causation Issues
American courts have utilized three different approaches with insurance
causation disputes involving multiple concurrent causation. On one extreme,
some courts still apply the traditional minority approach which tends to restrict
coverage in most concurrent causation situations. Under this traditional minor-
ity approach, if a covered cause combines with an excluded cause to produce a
loss, then the insured cannot recover under the policy based on the underlying
rationale that an insurer should not be held responsible for any loss caused by
an excluded peril. 10 6 The weakness of this traditional approach, however, is
that the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage - even under a
"common insured in the marketplace" standard 10 7 - are easily frustrated and
abrogated.
On the other extreme, some courts have adopted the so-called California
approach, holding that when loss occurs through the concurrence of covered
and excluded risks, the insurer would be liable for the entire loss so long as at
least one of the covered risks was a proximate cause of the loss.l°8 The advan-
tage of this liberalized California approach, at least for the insured policy-
holder, is that when various causes combine to produce an insured loss, a
"dominant" or "predominant" cause need not be shown - only a minimally
"sufficient" proximate cause. The major disadvantage of this liberalized con-
current causation rule, however, is that the insurer probably never intended to
provide such broad coverage under its policy and, not surprisingly, a number
of commentators in insurance defense journals have savagely attacked this so-
called California approach.' ° 9 Subsequently, the California Supreme Court
under then-Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas' more formalistic contractual
106 See, e.g., Lydick v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 187 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Neb. 1971) (holding that
this "general rule" is if a covered hazard combines with a hazard expressly excluded from
the policy coverage to produce a loss, the insured may not recover); Graff v. Farmer's Home
Ins. Co., 317 N.W.2d 741 (Neb. 1982) (similar holding).
107 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. See also Dixon v. Gunter, 636 S.W.2d 437,
441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Barber v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1982) (both stating that an insurance contract should be given a fair and reasonable
construction consonant with the plain intention of the parties, a construction that would be
given to the contract by "an ordinary intelligent business man" or "an average layperson who
is untrained in either law or insurance").
108 See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying California
law); Sabella v. Wisler, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Partridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Cal. 1973). See also Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 454
N.E.2d 1156 (I11. 1983); Henning Nelso Const. Co. v. Firemen's Fund, 361 N.W.2d 446
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N.W.2d 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972);
Benke v. Mukwonago Vernon Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1982).
109 See, e.g., Bragg, supra note 68; Houser & Kent, supra note 68; Litsey, supra note 68;
Houser, supra note 68; Wurefel & Koop, supra note 68.
These commentators make a careful distinction between property insurance concurrent
causation issues (i.e. Sabella) and liability insurance concurrent causation issues (i.e. Par-
tridge). In Sabella, the insureds sought coverage under their homeowners policy, and they
also brought a tort action against the contractor who built their house on inadequately com-
pacted land fill. The court held under the property insurance claim, that the settling exclu-
sion in the homeowners policy did not preclude liability because a leaking pipe was the
proximate cause of the loss, not the settling. In the tort action, the Sabella court held that the
insureds could also recover against the contractor due to his negligent construction.
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approach to insurance coverage disputes,"10 has repudiated this so-called "Cali-
fornia approach" in favor of requiring a "dominant" or "predominant" causal
nexus involving issues of concurrent causation.' 1
The more realistic and better reasoned approach to concurrent causation,
in order to validate both the insurer's contractual rights and obligations as well
as the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage, is to require the finding of
a covered dominant or predominant cause in any concurrent causation contro-
versy. Under this "middle ground" concurrent causation approach, which is the
prevailing rule in a majority of jurisdictions today, if multiple concurrent
causes exist, and if the dominant or predominant cause is a covered peril, then
coverage would exist for the entire loss, even though other concurrent causes
are not covered under the policy."' If neither cause is dominant, loss will
In Partridge, no first-party policy was involved. It was a personal liability case, involv-
ing an automobile, brought by a passenger against the driver. The passenger was injured
when the insured driver negligently drove off a paved highway while pursuing a rabbit, and a
.357 Magnum pistol which the insured had filed down so the pistol would have a "hair
trigger," went off injuring the passenger. The driver sought liability coverage under both his
automobile insurance policy, which covered injuries arising out of the "use" of the automo-
bile, and his homeowners policy, which explicitly excluded injuries arising out of the "use"
of the automobile. Neither the negligent driving nor the "hair trigger" alone would have
caused the injury. The California Supreme Court in Partridge opined:
[T]he "efficient cause" language is not very helpful, for here both causes were independent
of each other: the filing of the trigger did not "cause" the careless driving, nor vice versa. Both,
however, caused the injury. In traditional tort jargon, both are concurrent proximate causes of
the accident, the negligent driving constituting an intervening, but non-superceding, cause of the
accident.
Although there may be some question whether either of the two causes in the instant case
can be properly characterized as the "prime," "moving," or "efficient" cause of the accident, we
believe that coverage under a liability insurance policy is available to an insured whenever an
insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause of the injuries. That multiple causes
may have effectuated the loss does not negate any single cause; that multiple acts concurred in
the infliction of injury does not nullify any single contributory act.
Partridge, 514 P.2d at 130-31 n.10 (emphasis added). See generally Houser & Kent, supra
note 68, at 575-83.
11o See, e.g., Bill Blum, The California Supreme Court: Toward a Radical Middle, 77
A.B.A. J. 48 (Jan. 1991):
[T]he court has expressed a preference for deferring policy judgments affecting important social
issues and commercial relationships to legislative decision making. Some court watchers see this
as a healthy return to the proper role of the court as an interpreter, rather than a maker of law.
Others ... think the court is too deferential .... In the area of the common law," says former
Justice Grodin, I think the [Lucas court's] conservatism is reflected in the notion that it is unwise
to expand liability, that liability on the whole should be contracted, that contract principles
should be applied strictly and without regard, or with very little regard, for differences in bar-
gaining power between the parties, and in the tendency toward the insistence upon clear, bright
lines and rules. Id. at 50
"' See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Von der Leith, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (1991).
Property insurance companies also began adding additional exclusions for third party
contractor negligence (and other third party negligence) into their policies that had become
contentious issues in these prior coverage disputes. See generally Houser & Kent, supra
note 68; Litsey, supra note 68; Houser, supra note 68.
112 See, e.g., Goodman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1979) (applying
Maryland law); Ovbey v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 728 F.2d
178 (11 th Cir. 1986); Von der Leith, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183; Hahn v. MFA Ins. Co., 616 S.W.2d
HeinOnline  -- 2 Nev. L.J. 370 2002
INSURANCE CAUSATION ISSUES
probably be attributed to the cause that would result in coverage.' 13 For exam-
ple, in Shirone, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,1" 4 the insured's cattle
were killed during a violent storm that produced high winds, damp snow, and
muddy field conditions. The insurance policy insured livestock against death by
windstorm, but did not provide coverage for any loss caused by "dampness of
the atmosphere or extremes of temperature." Expert witnesses testified that the
cattle died due to a combination of concurrent causes, including wind, cold
temperature, snow, muddy conditions, lack of adequate wind protection, and
the size and age of the cattle. The jury found that the windstorm was the domi-
nant, efficient, and proximate cause of the loss, notwithstanding the contribu-
tions of the other noncovered factors, and this jury verdict was affirmed on
appeal." 5
This middle ground "dominant" or "predominant" concurrent causation
approach therefore is justified, not only because it honors the reasonable
expectation of the policyholder to coverage and disallows the insurer any
unconscionable advantage, but it is also justified based on the rationale of liber-
ally resolving any ambiguities regarding coverage in favor of the insured, and
strictly construing such ambiguities against the insurer." 6
D. Establishing a "Substantial" or "Sufficient" Causal Nexus
Even though a majority of courts arguably apply a "dominant" or "pre-
dominant" proximate cause approach to concurrent causation disputes in an
insurance law context, 17 one commentator notes that the major problem with
this proximate cause approach is that "courts have applied the concept inconsis-
tently by giving different meanings to various aspects of the concept at differ-
ent times" as to what is a "substantial cause" and what is not." 8 Ultimately, he
concedes that courts and juries must rely on "common sense and reasonable
judgment" to identify what constitutes a "substantial" cause of the loss. As
Professor Prosser eloquently notes, it is a decision "upon which all the learning,
literature and lore of the law are largely lost. It is a matter upon which any
layman is quite as competent to sit in judgment as the most experienced
court."' 1 9 Another commentator, however, has questioned whether these tradi-
tional proximate cause definitions are now an "empty concept":
Today it is difficult to remember how intellectually isolated the legal profession was
when Prosser did his earlier work. Law professors and lawyers had nowhere near the
574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Grace v. Litiz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1972); Yunker
v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 442 N.E.2d 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); King v. N. River Ins.
Co., 297 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1982).
113 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 527 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145
(App. Div. 1988); Wasecu Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W.2d 917, 920-23 (Minn. 1983).
114 570 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying Iowa law).
115 Id.
116 See generally ROBERT JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 67 (2d ed. 1996);
ROBERT KEETON & ALAN WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW §5.5 (1988); William Lasher, A Common
Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982).
117 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
118 See Litsey, supra note 68, at 436-37.
119 Id. (citing PROSSER ON TORTS § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971)).
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kind of contact with other professionals as they do today. 12 0 This was by no means
always a bad thing, but it obscured to some extent the complexities of judicial
reasoning.
Prosser's rather in-grown analysis no longer suffices in today's more compli-
cated legal world. Any updated analysis of proximate cause must take into
account: (a) the substantial increase in statutory-based actions; (b) the growth
of class actions in politically charged cases such as those involving guns and
cigarettes; (c) the increasing judicial skepticism toward both "junk science" and
doubtful expert testimony in general; and (d) the judicial favorism for insureds
in coverage cases involving causation issues ....
Judges who stretch causation rules in insurance coverage litigation also can be
said to be playing with institutional reform, in the sense that they rewrite insur-
ance contracts in obeisance to an idealized contract formation process that
never existed. For these judges, ambiguity rules have at times become post-hoc
equalizers of bargaining power. The implicit assumption in such decisions is
that, while private parties are properly delegated the right to make their own
contract law, the process must be fair, or, if not fair, it must be sanitized after
the fact. Contract language spelling out causation requirements often is a focus
of such interventions.121
However, whether a judge is a legal formalist 12 or a legal functionalist 123
in interpreting insurance coverage disputes, both jurisprudential schools still
120 Maybe so, but Mr. Haley might have overlooked the fact that Mr. Prosser was a success-
ful trial lawyer in Minnesota before he became an esteemed academic lawyer.
121 Haley, supra note 68, at 149-50.
122 Legal Formalism, also known as Legal Positivism, is the traditional view that correct
legal decisions are determined by pre-existing judicial and legislative precedent, and the rule
of law is viewed as a complete, autonomous system of logical, socially-neutral principles,
and rules. Judging under this formalistic theory is thus a matter of logical necessity rather
than a matter of choice. See, e.g., MARIO Joiu, LEGAL PosITIVsM (1992). See also Freder-
ick Schauer, Fonnalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing how Legal Formalism still
serves a legitimate function today in limiting judicial discretion and judicial activism).
In an insurance law context, Legal Formalism is best exemplified by the seminal writ-
ings and major influence of Professor Samuel Williston relating to American contract law in
general, and American insurance law in particular. The bedrock principle underlying Willis-
ton's formalistic view of insurance contract interpretation is that an insurance policy must be
construed and enforced according to general principles of contract law, and courts therefore
are not at liberty to reinterpret or modify the terms of a clearly written and unambiguous
insurance policy, but must look at the "plain meaning" of the insurance contract. 2 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:3 (4th ed. 1998). See generally Swisher, supra
note 90, at 748-52.
123 Legal Functionalism, also known as Legal Realism, is based on the belief that the For-
malist theory of a logical and socially neutral legal framework is rarely attainable, and may
be undesirable in a changing society, and the paramount concern of the law should not be
logical consistency, but socially desirable consequences. Thus, where Legal Formalism is
more logically-based and precedent-oriented, Legal Functionalism is more sociologically-
based and result-oriented. See, e.g., WILIFRED E. RUMBLE JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
(1968); GARY AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN JURISPRU-
DENCE (1990).
In an insurance law context, Legal Functionalism is best exemplified by the seminal
writings and major influence of Professor Arthur Corbin relating to American contract law in
general and American insurance law in particular. Professor Corbin was a major critic of
Professor Williston's "plain meaning" analysis of insurance contracts. According to Profes-
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agree that if an insurance contract is deemed to be unfair to the parties, then a
judge does have the right and the power to address this situation through a
number of well-recognized contractual remedies,1 2 4 and through causation
principles as well. Accordingly, courts and juries have agonized over many
years and in many insurance coverage disputes as to how "substantial" or "suf-
ficient" this causal nexus needs to be, but there does not appear to be any
overarching rule in answer to this basic question. For example, in fire and
property insurance coverage disputes, the courts are split as to whether or not
damage by heat, smoke, or soot would come within fire insurance coverage as a
"direct loss ' '125 caused by fire. 126 While some courts interpret a "direct loss"
caused by fire to require actual ignition, burning, or charring,127 the better rea-
soned "reasonable expectation" rule is to allow recovery for smoke and soot
damage as a sufficient causal nexus to constitute a "direct loss" caused by fire.
A second example involving fire and property insurance involves a num-
ber of cases where coverage is provided for any loss "by explosion" even
though there is a policy exclusion for "water damage." 128 Again, it would be
up to the court and trier of fact to determine in each particular case which of
these concurrent causes were "dominant" or "predominant," and whether or not
a sufficient causal nexus had in fact been established.
1 29
sor Corbin, "[t]he main purpose of contract law is the realization of the reasonable expecta-
tions" of the contracting parties, and there is "no single rule of interpretation of language,
and there are no rules of interpretation taken all together, that will infallibly lead to the one
correct understanding and meaning." 1 CORmIN ON CONTRACTS § 1:1, at 535 (1993 rev. ed.).
See generally Swisher, supra note 90, at 753-58.
124 See, e.g., Swisher, supra note 90, at 755:
Accordingly, Professor Corbin - like Professor Williston - was not willing to reject a number of
well-established rules of contract interpretation in pursuit of his more functional and contextual
approach to contract law, and Professor Corbin - like Professor Williston - therefore continued
to recognize a large number of traditional interpretive rules of contract interpretation to help
ascertain the parties' reasonable expectation to coverage including: contract ambiguity and the
doctrine of contra proferentem; contract unconscionability and public policy issues; and equita-
ble remedies such as waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and reformation
of contract. A fair reading of both Williston on Contracts and Corbin on Contracts therefore
suggest that there are far more similarities than differences in their respective approaches to
contract law in general, and insurance coverage disputes in particular.
125 Proximate cause in the construction of an insurance policy is generally synonymous with
"direct cause," and "efficient" cause generally means the "dominant" or "predominant"
cause. See Simon, supra note 68, at 36.
126 See generally A.M. Vann, Annotation, Loss by Heat, Smoke, or Soot Without External
Ignition As Within A Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 17 A.L.R.3d 1155 (1968).
127 See, e.g., Wash. State Hop Producers Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 660 P.2d 768 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that there was no evidence of any flame or glow to constitute a "direct
loss by fire" when 253 bales of hops stored in plaintiffs warehouse were damaged by
"browning").
121 See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Coverage of Clause of Fire Policy Insuring
Against Explosion, 28 A.L.R.2d 995 (1953) and Later Case Service.
129 See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 308 P.2d 119 (Kan. 1957) (holding
that where concrete sides of a grain elevator disintegrated due to flood waters which caused
the grain to expand and gases to form causing an explosion, damage was caused by an
"explosion" within the policy terms, rather than coming under the "water damage" exclu-
sion); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bulch, 350 P.2d 514 (Okla. 1960) (holding that where water
damage resulted from a hot water system, and the break in a copper water pipe resulted from
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Automobile liability insurance coverage disputes likewise frequently
involve the determination of a causal nexus from a loss "arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use" of an automobile or another insured vehicle.
Although some earlier courts applied a very restrictive interpretation of the
word "use" of an automobile to mean the actual "operation" of the vehicle, 130 a
majority of courts today have held that the "use" of an automobile is not neces-
sarily synonymous with "driving" or "operating" the vehicle, and it is sufficient
to show only that the accident "was connected with," "grew out of," or "flowed
from" the "use" of the automobile. 131
The courts are split, however, as to whether a "substantial" causal nexus
involving the "use" of the automobile is required, or only a minimal or "suffi-
cient" causal nexus is required in order to honor the insured's reasonable
expectation of coverage.' 32 For example, some courts have held that when a
plaintiff is injured as a result of an object thrown from an automobile, only a
minimal or "sufficient" causal nexus is required to find coverage, such as an
egg thrown from the window of a moving automobile which struck and injured
a pedestrian in California, 13 or a beer mug thrown from a moving vehicle that
struck and killed a pedestrian in Florida.' 34 Other courts, however, have
required a more substantial causal nexus between the thrown object and the
"use" of the vehicle. For example, no causal nexus was found between throw-
ing a bottle from the rear of a pickup truck in South Carolina and the "use" of
that vehicle,' 35 or throwing a firecracker from the rear of an automobile in
excessive temperature and pressure, the damage was due to an "explosion" rather than from
"water damage"). Query: would the result in either case have been different if the court had
utilized: (1) an "immediate cause" test; or (2) an "efficient" proximate cause test?
130 See, e.g., Kienstra v. Madison County Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. Ct. App.
1942) (defining "use" as the "operation" of the vehicle).
131 See, e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 732 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying
Montana law); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 691 P.2d 1289 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). See
generally Larry D. Schaefer, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What Are Acci-
dents or Injuries "Arising Out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use" of an Insured Vehicle,
15 A.L.R.4th 10 (1982); George Sayers, Coverage Problems Relating to the Policy Term
"Arising Out of the Use" of a Vehicle, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 253 (1969).
132 Compare Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Logan, 451 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1982)
(holding that an automobile insurer was not liable to its insured for an accident "arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of the automobile when the injury resulted from the
insured's fall in an icy automobile parking lot) with Novak v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 424
So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an insured was covered for loss "arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, and use" of her automobile when she was shot in her
driveway after refusing an assailant's request to give him a ride in her car).
133 See, e.g., Nat'l. Am. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 140 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that a sufficient causal connection had been established when a teenage boy threw
an egg from the window of a moving automobile, which struck a pedestrian in the eye, and
the injury was exacerbated by the automobile's forty m.p.h. speed).
"I See, e.g., Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 341
So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1974). See also Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 312 A.2d 664
(N.J. Super. 1973), aff'd, 319 A.2d 732 (N.J. 1974) (stick thrown from a moving vehicle
struck and injured a bicyclist).
135 See, e.g., Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Melton, 357 F. Supp. 416 (S.C. 1972) (applying
South Carolina law), aff'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).
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Michigan.1 36 Still other courts have held that if the vehicle is moving, and the
speed of the vehicle contributes to the impact of the thrown object (and conse-
quently to the extent of the injury), then there would be a sufficient causal
nexus with the "use" of the vehicle and the injury. 1 37 However, if an object
thrown from an automobile is "inherently dangerous" in itself, such as an M-80
explosive firework device, then there would not be a sufficient causal nexus
between the injury and the "use" of the vehicle.1 38 This same causal conun-
drum is illustrated in a number of cases discussing whether or not the acciden-
tal discharge of a firearm in an automobile constitutes the "use" of that vehicle.
Not surprisingly, the courts are split on this causal issue as well.
1 39
So query: is this causation conundrum between a "substantial" and a "suf-
ficient" causal nexus in insurance coverage disputes only one more example of
the continuing jurisprudential "battle" between legal formalists' 4 ° and legal
functionalists 4 ' for the "heart and soul" of insurance contract law? 42 Perhaps
136 See, e.g., Richland Knox Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1967) (applying
Michigan law). See also Mazon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 491 P.2d 455 (Ariz. 1971) (no causal
connection was found between a stone thrown by an unknown person in an unidentified car
and the "ownership, maintenance, or use" of that vehicle).
137 See, e.g., Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 828.
138 See, e.g., Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Evans, 637 P.2d 491, 494 (Kan. 1981) (M-80 fire-
cracker thrown from the back seat of a station wagon landed in a glass of beer held by the
plaintiff and exploded, causing serious injuries).
139 Compare S.E. Fid. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 236 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) and Fid. &
Cas. Co. v. Lott, 273 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1950) (applying Texas law) (both finding coverage)
with U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. W. Fire Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1970) and State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 543 P.2d 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (both find-
ing no coverage). See generally Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Dis-
putes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 543, 625-29 (1996).
140 See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
141 See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., Robert Jerry II, supra note 88, at 55-56:
On one side are the formalists or classicists, whose champions are Professor Williston and
the first Restatement of Contracts. The formalists care mightily about texts and the four corners
of documents. They believe that words often have a plain meaning that exists independently of
any sense in which the speaker or writer may intend the words. They insist that a court or a party
can discern the meaning of contractual language without asking about the intentions or expecta-
tions of the parties. They contend that interpretation is appropriate only if an ambiguity appears
on the face of the document, which means that the parties by their own testimony about what
they intended or expected cannot create an ambiguity where none exists .... In the world of the
formalists, an insurer that drafts a clear form should be entitled to rely on that form in setting
rates without worrying that a court will disregard the finely tuned, clear language ....
The other contestants in the battle for the soul of contract law are the functionalists, who are
sometimes also labeled as the progressives, the realists, or the post-classicists. The champions of
this side are Professor Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The functionalists care
less about the text of contracts, believing it to be most useful as an articulation of the objective
manifestations of the contracting parties and as a means to understanding their intentions and
expectations . . . . Text does not have inherent meaning, but text means what the drafter or
speaker knows or should know the other side will understand those words to mean in context
.... Where a form is standardized, the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable expecta-
tions for whatever the particular recipient of the form understood, given that the recipient has
less reason to know what the drafter means, while the drafter has insights into what the ordinary,
reasonable recipient of the form is likely to understand.
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in part. But since Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,143 most courts
and commentators now agree that the underlying causation rationale for insur-
ance coverage disputes is not solely based on the objective tort concept of fore-
seeable harm, but also is interpreted according to the reasonable expectations
of the contracting parties."4 Accordingly, whether this "reasonable expecta-
tions" test is contractually-based' 4 5 or whether it is based on a Keetonian
"rights at variance with the policy language" rationale,' 46 when justice and
equity so requires, courts ought to be able to recognize either a "substantial" or
a "sufficient" causal nexus test in insurance coverage disputes, and therefore,
[judges in jurisdictions that continue to recognize a pro-Williston "plain meaning"
approach to insurance contract disputes, as well as judges in jurisdictions that have
adopted a more pro-Corbin functionalistic approach to insurance contract disputes,
are both still able to "do justice and equity" in recognizing and validating the reason-
able expectations of the parties to coverage ....147
E. Coverage for Acts "Expected or Intended" by the Insured
Since insurance normally is intended to cover only accidental or unin-
tended losses, any losses that are intentionally caused by an insured generally
are not covered in property insurance 148 and liability insurance 4 9 policies.
Likewise, in life, health, and accident insurance policies, an "accidental" death
Id. See also Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1039-58 (1991).
143 See supra notes 77- 94 and accompanying text.
1" See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
141 Swisher, supra note 90, at 757-58. In many cases, a "dominant" and "substantial"
causal nexus may be required, but not always. For example, an underlying public policy
rationale for automobile liability insurance is to secure compensation for third party victims
of highway accidents. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 116, at 385-86. Accordingly,
many courts in automobile insurance coverage disputes tend to apply a minimal or "suffi-
cient" causal nexus requirement. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text. As Benja-
min Cardozo reminds us:
One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall be uniform and impartial .... But
symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price. Uniformity ceases to be good when
it becomes uniformity of oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must
then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness ....
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921).
148 See, e.g., Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 696 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1985); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cuminsky, 665 P.2d 223 (Mont. 1983). See also JERRY, supra note 116,
§ 63A at 384:
If the insured intentionally causes damage to his or her own property, the loss is not covered. The
public policy supporting this exclusion is identical to that which supports the insurable interest
requirement. Insureds should not receive coverage for destroying their own property. Otherwise,
insureds would have an incentive in many instances to destroy their property and collect the
proceeds.
Id.
And see Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liability for Intentional Acts of Family Members: Will Your
Insurer Stand By You?, 68 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that courts expanding bases of
liability against family members should interpret homeowners' insurance policies liberally in
order to achieve a coextensive tort-insurance compensation regime and validate the reasona-
ble expectations of insureds to coverage).
[Vol. 2:351
HeinOnline  -- 2 Nev. L.J. 376 2002
INSURANCE CAUSATION ISSUES
generally is defined as a death that is not expected or intended from the view-
point of the insured. 5' But how have the courts interpreted such loss that is
not "expected or intended" from the standpoint of the insured?
In life and accident insurance policies, a confusing and highly technical
insurance law doctrine purportedly attempted to distinguish between "acciden-
tal means" - which is interpreted as synonymous with "cause" - and "acciden-
tal results." '' This highly confusing and overly technical legalistic distinction
between "accidental means" and "accidental results" was criticized by Justice
Benjamin Cardozo in his famous dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Insur-
ance Co. 152 as creating an unwarranted "Serbonian Bog" ' 3 for the unwary and
unsophisticated insured, and the vast majority of courts and commentators over
time also have repudiated this archaic and overly-technical legal distinction. 1
54
And yet, as Professor Adam Scales cautions,
149 See, e.g., KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 116, at 493, 518-33 ("Losses which are inten-
tionally caused by an insured generally are not covered by liability insurance."). See also
James L Rigelhaupt, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability
Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31
A.L.R.4th 957 (1984); Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect
of Assault and Battery Exclusion in Liability Insurance Policy at Issue, 44 A.L.R.5th 91
(1996).
150 See, e.g., Scales, supra note 87, at 245 ("Because accident insurers did not intend to
indemnify against intentional harms ... they responded by drafting exclusions against inten-
tionally inflicted injuries.") See also Witt, supra note 21, at 690. In the absence of an
express statutory or contractual definition, the word "accident" or "accidental" used in life,
health, and accident insurance policies generally is given its ordinary and popular meaning
as something that happens suddenly or unexpectedly without any intentional design on the
part of the insured or the person injured. See generally 10 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW §41:7-8 (Mark S. Rhodes ed., rev. 2d ed. 1984).
151 See, e.g., Linder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 250 S.E.2d 662, 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). See
generally Rothman, The Meaning of the "Accidental Means" Clause in Accident Insurance
Policies, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 231 (1981); Annotation, Insurance: "Accidental Means" as
Distinguished from "Accident," "Accidental Result," "Accidental Death," "Accidental
Injury," Etc., 166 A.L.R. 469 (1947).
152 291 U.S. 491 (1934) (dissenting opinion). The issue in Landress was whether or not the
insured, who died of sunstroke during a golf game, was covered under the "accidental death"
provision in his life insurance policy. See also Kristine Karnezis, Annotation, Heart Attack
Following Exertion or Exercise as Within Terms of Accident Provision of Insurance Policy,
I A.L.R.4th 1319 (1980).
151 See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Hemenover, 67 P.2d 80, 81
(Colo. 1937) ("Whatever kind of a bog that is, we concur"). Milton describes the Serbonian
Bog as "betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius [in Egypt]" "where [Pharaoh's] Armies [and
Fallen Angels] have sunk." JOHN MILTON, PAADISE LOST, Book I1 46 (Merritt Hughes ed.,
1962). Some courts have argued that Cardozo's Serbonian Bog is still with us today:
The "Serbonian Bog" is not the distinction between means and results; it is rather the entire field
of accident law. As long as we cannot control historical facts or ignore the language of contracts,
we will be forced to slosh through the bog. The necessity of that march will not be avoided by
saying, as Justice Cardozo would have us do, that the word, "means," is equivalent to another,
"cause."
Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 340 (Md. 1970).
154 See, e.g., Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 67 N.E.2d 248, 251-52
(N.Y. 1946) ("Legal scholars have spent much effort in attempts to evolve a sound theory of
causation and to explain the nature of an 'accident' .... Our guide must be the reasonable
expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when making an insurance contract
such as we have here . . . . In this State there is no longer any distinction made between
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the victory is illusory. Litigation does not seem to have slowed in the wake of Car-
dozo's ascendency. Courts rejecting the distinction in the name of policyholder
expectations or conceptual clarity have not found resolving accidental death claims
any easier. This is not surprising. Merely rejecting "means" in favor of "results"
leaves unanswered the question of what is accidental - a persistent conundrum not
easily answered simply by posing it in a slightly different way.
155
Part of this "persistent conundrum" is the fact that the courts are widely
split regarding what constitutes an "accidental" death in life, health, and acci-
dent insurance policies. On one hand, a number of courts employ an objective
or "classic tort" doctrine that if an injury or death was reasonably foreseeable
as a natural consequence of an intentional act, then it could not be acciden-
tal.1 56 Other courts, however, have adopted a more liberal subjective definition
of what constitutes an "accidental" death, holding that when a particular
insured commits a voluntary act, not intending to cause himself harm, this act
would constitute an accidental death within the terms of the policy coverage. 1
57
accidental death and death by accidental means, nor between accidental means and acciden-
tal results.").
See also Scales, supra note 87, at 266:
This repudiation [of the accidental-means-accidental result distinction] has received essentially
unanimous approval, or at least acceptance, from commentators unaffiliated with the insurance
industry. It has been expressly endorsed by the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers, which in 1974 recommended that policies be interpreted consistent with "accidental results"
language, regardless of the use of "accidental means" language. Moreover, this principle has
been implemented by statute and regulation in several states. Since the 1940s, courts have shown
a definite trend toward abolishing the distinction, relying explicitly on Cardozo's dissent ... it
appears that the pro-Cardozo forces have recently achieved majority status at the state level and
have firmly conquered federal courts developing the common law of ERISA. Finally, in a sign of
capitulation, for several decades insurers have been slowly removing "accidental means" lan-
guage from their policies, referring instead simply to "accidents" or recursively-defined coverage
triggers like "accidental bodily injury."
'5 Id. at 267.
156 Courts applying this "classic tort" approach tend to look at the insured's voluntary acts
from an objective "reasonable insured" viewpoint. See, e.g., Jones v. Fireman's Fund Am.
Life Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that there was no accidental
death by a handgun during an ensuing struggle since the death was a foreseeable conse-
quence of a deliberate act when the husband aimed the pistol at his wife's head); Nicholas v.
Providential Life & Accident Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970) (playing
"Russian roulette" with a loaded pistol does not constitute an accidental death since the
consequences of the insured's act are foreseeable). See also Wooden v. John Hancock Life
Ins. Co., 139 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 1965) (holding that if the death of the insured, although in a
sense unforeseen and unexpected, results directly from the insured's voluntary act or mis-
conduct, or if the insured provokes an act which causes death or injury, it is not an accidental
death, even though the result may be accident). Cf Cockrell v. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 1164
(8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas law) (pointing out that Arkansas state courts have
declined to adopt the "classic tort" concept that one intends the natural and foreseeable
consequence of one's deliberate acts so as to bar recovery for unintended results).
117 Courts applying this approach tend to look upon the insured's voluntary acts from a
subjective "particular insured" viewpoint. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 299
F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying California law) (The insured shot and killed himself by
placing a loaded gun to his temple and pulling the trigger, mistakenly thinking that the safety
catch was engaged. The court ruled his death was accidental); Knight v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
437 P.2d 416 (Ariz. 1968) (The insured died after a voluntary dive from atop the Coolidge
Dam in Arizona, a height of more than 139 feet. He had previously made dives from heights
of 25, 40, 50, and 75 feet from diving boards, ship decks, rocky ledges, and box canyons,
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In practice, however, these two interpretive approaches are difficult to
apply. 158
One rather bizarre example of this interpretive conundrum of what consti-
tutes an "accidental" death is found in a number of life insurance coverage
disputes brought by the beneficiaries of insureds who died as a result of inten-
tionally "hanging" themselves in order to create an asphyxial state for an alleg-
edly heightened autoerotic experience. 159 Not surprisingly, a number of courts
that utilize an objective "classic tort" analysis for determining what a "reasona-
ble insured" would do, have held that these intentional acts on the part of the
insured would not constitute an "accidental" death since death was a foresee-
able consequence of the insured's intentional act of self-induced asphyxia-
tion. 160 Other courts, however, employing a subjective "particular insured"
standard, have held that even though the insured committed voluntary autoe-
rotic asphyxiation, he did not intend to ultimately kill himself by hanging, and
therefore this would constitute an "accidental" death.' 6 1
and he stated (correctly) that the Coolidge Dam venture would be his last dive. The court
ruled the insured's death was accidental). But see Scales, supra note 87, at 241: "Yet hard
cases make bad law, and the focus of the insured's subjective expectations created a doctri-
nal instability from which accident insurance has never recovered."
158 Compare Bias v. Advantage Int'l Inc., 905 F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying D.C.
law) (holding that an insurance agent was not liable for failing to procure insurance coverage
on basketball star Len Bias, since Bias's death from cocaine intoxication was a foreseeable
consequence of a deliberate act and not an accidental death), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958
(1990) with Marsh v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 1121 (111. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
that an insured's death by a self-administered overdose of heroin was an accidental death).
See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Death or Injury From Taking Illegal Drugs or
Narcotics as Accidental or the Result of Accidental Means Within Insurance Coverage, 32
A.L.R.5th 629 (1995).
159 Autoerotic asphyxiation is a practice that involves self-induced choking to heighten sex-
ual pleasure during masterbation, and apparently there are hundreds of these atypical "acci-
dental death" cases each year. See, e.g., Alan Stevens, Annotation, Accident or Life
Insurance: Death by Autoerotic Asphyxiation as Accidental, 62 A.L.R.4th 823 (1988);
COUCH, supra note 150, §41:16; Jane Uva, Autoerotic Asphyxiation in the United States, 40
J. FORENSIC Sci. 574 (1995).
160 See, e.g., Sigler v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Iowa law)
(holding that since a reasonable person would have recognized that an insured's act of
"hanging" himself to create an asphyxial state for a heightened masturbating experience
could have resulted in death, this was not an accident, and recovery was barred under the
policy exclusion for intentional acts). See also Int'l Underwriters Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662
F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Virginia law) (similar holding); Runge v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying Virginia law) (similar holding); Sims v.
Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying coverage under the pol-
icy's intentional injury exclusion).
161 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1981) (holding that, based upon the testimony of two physicians, the insured's death by
autoerotic asphyxiation was unforeseeable and unintended, and therefore the insured's death
was an accidental death); Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 1987)
(holding that the insured, an orthopedic surgeon, knew of the medical risks of asphyxiation,
and although his conduct was bizarre and unusual, his death nevertheless was unintended
and accidental); Todd v. AIG Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that death by
autoerotic asphyxiation in a ERISA coverage dispute was not "highly likely to occur" and
thus' was accidental). But see contra Int'l Underwriters, 662 F.2d 1084 (holding that even
though the insured, a civil engineer, constructed a "fail safe" device to prevent autoerotic
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Is there any viable way to resolve this interpretive conundrum on what
constitutes, or should constitute, an "accidental" death? The First Circuit Court
of Appeals employed a very persuasive and realistic interpretive approach in
the case of Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. 162 where the
court attempted to apply federal common law under ERISA. The facts in this
particular case were that the insured, Wickman, fell from a railroad bridge forty
to fifty feet above the railroad tracks. Before his fall, a witness said he saw
Wickman standing on the outside of the bridge's guard rail, holding on to it
with only his right hand. When asked in the hospital emergency room, before
he died, what had happened, Wickman replied, "I jumped off.' 16 3 Wickman's
accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy specifically provided
that benefits would not be paid "for loss directly or indirectly caused by sui-
cide" or "intentionally self-inflicted injury" whether the insured was sane or
insane. 16 The lower court magistrate held, and the appellate court affirmed,
that there were only three possible explanations for Wickman's actions: (1) he
intended to commit suicide; (2) he intended to seriously injure himself; or (3)
having so positioned himself on the bridge, he inadvertently or mistakenly
fell. 165  Under the first two scenarios, the policy would have excluded
coverage.
The Wickman court then had to devise a test that, following Justice Car-
dozo's dissent in the Landress case, 16 6 rejected the archaic and hyper technical
accidental-means accidental-result distinction, yet could not permit the
"insured's subjective, yet unreasonably optimistic" expectation of coverage.' 67
The Wickman court selected the "reasonable expectations of the insured" as a
starting point of its analysis. The court then articulated a three-step process.
First, the trier of fact is to determine what the insured's subjective expectation
was, i.e., whether the insured actually "expected an injury similar in type or
kind to that suffered." If not, the second question was whether the insured's
expectations were reasonable, taking into account the particular insured's per-
sonal characteristics and experiences. And third, if the trier of fact is unable to
determine what the insured's actual subjective expectations were, then an
objective "reasonable insured" standard is required.' 68
"In practice," observes Professor Adam Scales, "Wickman's [widely influ-
ential] three step test has been collapsed into the quasi-objective inquiry con-
tained in step three. Courts invariably bottom conclusions as to coverage upon
a determination of what someone like the insured would have expected to result
from [his or her] assertedly accidental conduct."' 169 Other courts, however,
have interpreted Wickman to preclude coverage only when death or serious
asphyxiation that unfortunately malfunctioned, the insured's death was not an accident, since
it still was a foreseeable consequence of the insured's deliberate act).162 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990). This case involved an employee's accidental death and
dismemberment insurance coverage as part of a ERISA plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
163 Id. at 1080.
164 Id. at 1084.
165 Id. at 1083.
166 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
167 See generally Scales, supra note 87, at 294-96.
168 Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088-89.
169 Scales, supra note 87, at 296.
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injury is "highly likely to occur."17 In conclusion, the three-step Wickman
analysis for determining whether an insured's death is "accidental" or not,
however imperfect it may be, nevertheless brings back some interpretive objec-
tivity (or quasi-objectivity) in order to try and determine the intent of an
insured who, being dead, cannot assist the trier of fact in this rather difficult
task, rather than totally relying on an often specious and unsupportable subjec-
tive test of what a particular insured might have intended.
There is also a great deal of litigation in liability insurance coverage dis-
putes regarding whether or not an insured's actions resulting in bodily injury or
property damage were "expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured." 7 ' Paralleling interpretive disputes involving accident insurance,'
72
American courts are also split in liability insurance coverage disputes on how
to characterize an insured's intentional acts. A number of courts continue to
apply the "classic tort" doctrine of looking to the natural and probable conse-
quences of the insured's intentional act. Thus, where an intentional act by the
insured results in personal injuries or property damage which are a natural and
foreseeable result of that act, then such injuries or property damage are deemed
to be intentional for purposes of the intentional injury exclusionary clause (i.e.
acts that are "expected or intended" from the standpoint of the insured) in lia-
bility insurance policies.
173
A number of other courts, however, have specifically rejected this "classic
tort" doctrine, and hold instead that the insured must have had the intent to
cause the specific type of harm or injury suffered by the third party plaintiff in
order to come under the intentional injury exclusionary clause in a liability
17o See, e.g., Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1455-56 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
Wickman to find coverage in an autoerotic asphyxiation case since death or serious injury
was not "highly likely to occur"). But query: couldn't a trier of fact in autoerotic asphyxia-
tion cases, applying a quasi-objective "reasonable insured" standard under Wickman, also
find that death was "highly likely to occur?" See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
171 For example, contemporary liability insurance policies often state that insurance is pro-
vided for damages that are caused by an "occurrence" which is defined as an "accident" that
"results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the stand-
point of the insured" (emphasis added). See generally 11 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW § 44:285 (Mark S. Rhodes ed., rev. 2d ed. 1984); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note
117, § 5.4(d); James L. Rigelhaupt Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provi-
sion of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by the
Insured, 31 A.L.R.4th 957 (1984).
172 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
173 See, e.g., Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bentley, 953 P.2d 1297 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
injury resulting from the insured tape-recording a sexual encounter and playing that tape to
third parties was foreseeable as a matter of law, and thus was within a homeowners' insur-
ance policy intentional acts exclusion since the results of the insured's intentional acts were
reasonably foreseeable, even if the insured did not intend to harm his sexual partner); Erie
Ins. Group v. Buckner, 489 S.E.2d 901 (N.C. App. 1997) (Under Virginia law, the "expected
or intended" injury exclusion in a homeowners' policy barred liability insurance coverage
for the insured when he struck the plaintiff in the forehead with his fist. The insured should
have expected that injury was likely to occur, even if he did not actually intend to injure the
third party plaintiff). See also Cas. Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 647 P.2d 1361 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1982); N.W. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1979); Vittum v. N.H. Ins.
Co., 369 A.2d 184 (N.H. 1977); Argonaut S.W. Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.
1973); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Traveler's Indem. Co. 286 S.E.2d 225 (Va. 1982).
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insurance policy.' 74 Moreover, the courts have applied one of three different
approaches to interpret coverage-or exclusion from coverage-for sexual assault
or molestation "intentionally caused" or "expected or intended" by the insured.
One approach is that the intentional acts exclusion would not apply unless the
insured subjectively intended to cause the specific injury.' 7 5 Other courts have
applied an objective "classic tort" test for determining what constitutes inten-
tional sexual assault. 17 6 Still other courts have ruled that in sexual assault and
molestation cases, the insured's intent to cause injury will be inferred from the
act as a matter of law, 177 especially when the victim of such sexual assault or
molestation is a minor.
1 7 8
Which is the better reasoned interpretive approach for determining
whether or not an insured comes under an intentional acts exclusion in liability
insurance coverage disputes? On one hand, it can be argued from a persuasive
line of precedential authority beginning with Cardozo's decision in the Bird
case, 179 that the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties should be
utilized rather than applying a "classic tort" foreseeability rule,' 8° and therefore
the particular insured's subjective intent to cause specific harm should be rec-
ognized and applied. 8 '
On the other hand, when an intentional acts exclusionary provision is
clearly and unambiguously written into a liability insurance contract, why
shouldn't the objective intent and the reasonable expectations of a reasonable
insured to cause foreseeable harm not be taken into account?' 8 2 Perhaps the
three-step quasi-objective analysis utilized by the Wickman court in accident
insurance disputes' 83 might be applied as well to liability insurance disputes.
But realistically, how many insured defendants will admit in court under oath,
"well, yes, when I hit the plaintiff upside the head, I really did intend to put
him in a coma and kill him." Not very many.
174 See, e.g., Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 1187 (Idaho 1986) (for an
"intentional acts" exclusion to operate, an insurer must be able to show that its insured acted
for the purpose of causing a specific injury to a person or property, which resulted. It is not
sufficient that the insured's intentional act, however wrongful, resulted in unintended harm;
it is the harm itself that must be intended before the exclusion will apply); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417 (S.C. 1994) (Under South Carolina law, the application of an
intentional act exclusion in a homeowners' policy requires a two-prong analysis: (1)
whether the act causing the loss was intentional; and (2) whether the results of the act were
intended by the insured). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 493 A.2d 1110 (Md. Ct. App.
1985); Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 1978); Oakes v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 349 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. 1975); Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Bollinger, 476
N.W.2d 697 (S.D. 1991); Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 1979).
175 See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions, 607 P.2d 422 (Idaho 1980); Pub. Serv. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1981).
176 See, e.g., CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689 (Ark. 1984).
177 See, e.g., Linebaugh v. Berdisch, 376 N.W.2d 400 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
178 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Mugavero, 581 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1992).
179 See generally supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 173 and 176 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
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Since, generally speaking, intentional acts will bar coverage under most
property and liability insurance policies,'" 4 competent policyholder attorneys
will often characterize insurable losses in their pleadings not in terms of willful
or intentional acts by the insured that arguably would be excluded from cover-
age, but in terms of gross negligence or recklessness on the part of the insured
that may be covered.' 85
Finally, a number of courts have held that an "intentional" act does not
always bar recovery in various liability insurance coverage disputes. For exam-
ple, although many courts still interpret accidental and intentional conduct in
liability insurance coverage disputes from the standpoint of the insured,' 8 6 a
number of other courts, in order to broaden liability insurance coverage to pro-
tect injured third-party plaintiffs, also have interpreted accidental or intentional
conduct from the viewpoint of the injured party. 187 Thus, in various liability
insurance coverage disputes, creative policyholder attorneys, and courts have
found coverage when the insured: intentionally shot and wounded another per-
son; 18 assaulted and injured another person with a motor vehicle;' 89 and inten-
tionally polluted the environment.' 9 °
The underlying rationale for this judicial approach expanding liability
insurance coverage for acts "expected or intended" by the insured is based on
three interrelated factors: (1) that an exclusionary clause for intentional injury
in a liability insurance policy is "inherently ambiguous";191 (2) that the words
"expected" and "intended" are not synonymous for purposes of construing an
intentional injury exclusion provision in a liability insurance policy;192 and (3)
'84 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability Insurance as Covering Accident Injury
Due to Wanton or Willful Misconduct or Gross Negligence, 20 A.L.R.3d 320 (1968).
186 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 411 N.E.2d 1157 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980); Great
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Legg, 444 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969).
187 See, e.g., Haser v. Md. Cas. Co., 53 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1952); Fox Wis. Corp. v. Cen-
tury Indem. Co., 263 N.W. 567 (Wis. 1935). See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note
116, at 510-13, 518-44.
188 See, e.g., Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Colonial
Penn Ins. Co. v. Hart, 291 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364 (Neb. 1973). But see contra Armstrong v. Sec. Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d
134 (Ala. 1973); Draffen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 407 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Bay State Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451 N.E.2d 880 (111. 1983).
189 See, e.g., Ind. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brandum, 419 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 322 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Peterson v. W.
Cas. & Sur. Co., 93 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. 1958). But see contra Boyd v. Great Century Ins.
Co., 401 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1981); Wigginton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 170
(La. Ct. App. 1964); Dochod v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
190 See, e.g., Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prod. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145 (D. Or. 1966). But
see contra Ashland Oil Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982)
(applying Louisiana law).
191 See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions, 607 P.2d 422 (Idaho 1980); Home Ins. Co. v.
Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); N. Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 125 F.3d 983
(6th Cir. 1997) (applying Michigan law). But see contra Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 579
P.2d 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Talley v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 260 (Ark. 1981);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 575 N.W.2d I I (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
192 See, e.g., Bay State Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451 N.E.2d 880 (I11. 1983); N.W. Nat'l Cas. Co.
v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1979). But see contra Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Summer 20021
HeinOnline  -- 2 Nev. L.J. 383 2002
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
that the "classic tort" doctrine of looking at the foreseeable consequences of an
insured's intentional acts193 is not appropriate in a liability insurance context
since an insured must have had the specific intent to cause the specific type of
injuries suffered.194
IV. CONCLUSION
Since most research in the field of legal causation primarily has occurred
in the context of tort law, and since insurance law has been defined as some-
what of a hybrid between tort and contract, many American courts traditionally
have applied "classic tort" causation principles to insurance coverage disputes
as well. Beginning with Benjamin Cardozo's landmark decision in Bird v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., however, a growing number of American
courts have begun to recognize that while most insurance cases still require
direct "but for" causation similar to tort law, nevertheless insurance proximate
cause issues are not primarily based on a foreseeability of harm, but rather
upon the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. Accordingly, over
the past eight decades, American courts have struggled mightily to analyze and
resolve various insurance causation issues from a number of very different
perspectives.
Some courts determine coverage by applying an "immediate cause" ratio-
nale, while other courts employ an "efficient" proximate cause "chain of
events" doctrine similar to tort law, or utilize a hybrid approach combining
both these rules. The courts likewise have employed no less than three different
insurance law approaches to address multiple concurrent causation issues, and
they have disagreed on whether an "efficient" proximate cause approach to
concurrent causation requires a "substantial" causal nexus or only a "sufficient"
causal nexus. Finally, the courts have split dramatically on how to determine
whether an insured loss is "accidental" or "intentional." Some courts continue
to apply a traditional "classic tort" doctrine which looks at the natural and fore-
seeable consequences of the insured's acts from the standpoint of an objective
"reasonable insured." Other courts, however, have expressly rejected this
"classic tort" doctrine, and instead view an insured's acts from the subjective
viewpoint of a "particular insured" in order to determine the insured's "reason-
able expectation" of coverage.
Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Maine 1981); Poston v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1982).
"' See supra note 173 and accompanying text. The insurance industry recently has taken
steps to clarify this interpretive conundrum. For example, the 1999 Homeowners 3 sample
policy from the Insurance Services Office provides the following exclusion under Coverage
E for "Expected or Intended Injury":
"Bodily Injury" or "property damage" which is expected or intended by an "insured" even if the
resulting "bodily injury" or "property damage":
a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended; or
b. Is sustained by a different person, entity, real or personal property, than initially expected or
intended.
However, this Exclusion . . . does not apply to "bodily injury" resulting from the use of
reasonable force by an "insured" to protect persons or property.
194 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. See generally Rigelhaupt, supra note 149;
Swisher, supra note 139, at 630-34. But see contra supra note 193.
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Regardless of which particular standard a court may employ in its attempt
to resolve insurance causation issues - and there are many divergent
approaches - these interpretive rules must still be sufficiently malleable and
flexible when applied to differing circumstances and conditions to validate the
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties, however that concept ulti-
mately is determined by a court or a trier of fact. In both tort law and insurance
law, then, "common sense and reasonable judgment" ultimately must resolve
most of these causation issues, and it still arguably remains "a matter upon
which any layman is quite as competent to sit in judgment as the most exper-
ienced court."' 95
195 See supra notes 100 and 119 and accompanying text.
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